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Introduction 
 
In his book The Epic of America, James Truslow Adams coined the term American 
Dream as “that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, 
with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement.”(Adams, 1931) It is this ideal 
that has become ingrained in worldwide citizens with the image of the U.S. as the land of 
opportunity, the place that promises happiness for those who choose to work hard. 
But this noble ideal seems to be contradicted by the statistics provided by the academic 
community in recent years. In 2014, the French economist Thomas Piketty published his best-
selling book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, showing that inequality of income and wealth 
across the world has increased to the high level of the pre Word War I era. The U.S., ironically, 
is the country with the highest level of inequality. If opportunity is abundant, why are some 
people reaping much larger payoffs than others? According to the World Prison Population List 
(10th edition), in 2013 the U.S. had the highest rate of incarceration in the world: 716 per 100,000 
of national population, compared with 144 per 100,000 worldwide (Walmsley, 2013). Are there 
significantly more people in the U.S. who do not want to work hard and follow shortcuts by 
committing crime, compared to other countries?  In November 2015, Angus Deaton, the recent 
winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science, and Anne Case, an economic professor at 
Princeton University and Deaton’s wife, published data on mortality rates, showing that the 
death rates for middle-aged white Americans have been rising. The main group that drives the 
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mortality rate higher is the poor and undereducated, who are most likely to abuse drugs, alcohol, 
and commit suicide. The U.S. is the only developed country that experiences this phenomenon 
(The New York Times, 2015).  
Was it merely the prisoners’ fault to commit crimes? Did those at the bottom of the 
income and wealth distribution choose to not work as hard as those at the top? Did people choose 
to be undereducated, to have low income, and to eventually abuse substance and commit suicide? 
Mass incarceration, rising income and wealth inequality, and increasing death rate do not seem to 
go along with a “better, richer and fuller” life for Americans. How do we cope with these bleak 
statistics? What is the link between these grand-scale numbers and the stories of the individuals 
who suffer? How did these grim developments all start? 
To answer these questions the present project is structured along three separate, yet 
interconnected, essays. The first essay introduces Roemer’s (1998) model, one useful way to 
define equality of opportunity, and presents some criticisms of it. We provide an argument on 
how the model can be applicable to the real world, at least to a particular period of life. In the 
second essay, we leave behind the theoretical framework of equality of opportunity to focus on 
the real world. We review some findings on income and wealth inequality as well as 
intergenerational mobility, and introduce a controversial model of social mobility. We point out 
a drawback these branches of research have in common, and transition to a promising research 
direction in the third essay. In this essay, we review the literature on the mechanisms of mobility 
and introduce some major results of the study of early childhood development. We finalize the 
project by discussing the relationship among the three essays in the conclusion. 
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This project is a small attempt to understand the process that leads to inequality. We do 
not presume to finish such a daunting task; rather, we aim to draw attention to a perspective that 
can potentially lead to productive research in the future. 
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ESSAY 1 –  
Roemer’s Model of Equality of 
Opportunity 
Generally people have negative attitudes towards inequality, be it inequality of wealth, 
income, education, or other aspects. The deepest concern is that inequality might be a barrier to 
bettering one’s life. When the playing field is levelled, people celebrate industriousness and 
discourage idleness. Equality must then take into account relative effort expended. As 
summarized in Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014), ideally, inequality then can be divided into two 
sources: legitimate and illegitimate inequality. As long as inequality comes from legitimate 
reasons, it is more tolerated by society. 
In this essay, we introduce Roemer’s (1998) model of equality of opportunity, one that 
takes into account people’s willingness to work. We then discuss the problems of the model by 
analysing it from the perspective of welfare and distributive justice. At the end of the essay, we 
provide an analysis on the drawbacks of the model, and provide an argument about how the 
model can be reasonably applied to the early childhood period.  
1.1 The Roemer’s (1998) Model  
         Roemer’s model aims to provide an algorithm to determine how to level the playing field. 
The model makes two main assumptions: (1) factors outside of a person’s control and factors 
under a person’s control can be separated into circumstances and efforts, and (2) within each 
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group of people whose factors outside of their control are the same, we can determine how much 
they differ in the amount of effort they exert. With these two assumptions, Roemer proceeds to 
define what he means by “equality of opportunity.”  
 The foundation of Roemer’s framework is the separation of circumstances and effort. 
Circumstances are all factors that are beyond the control of a subject, and effort is the amount of 
work that the subject exerts (we postpone detailed discussion of circumstances for now). Roemer 
supposes that vectors of circumstances can be enumerated, and each vector represents one type 
of person. Types are assumed to be finite, and each type contains a subset of the population 
under discussion. To ensure that the size of each type is viable for analysis, the number of types 
is limited to a manageable level. Note that by this definition, individuals in each type would have 
the same resources. 
Within each type, there is a distribution of effort exerted by its members. Roemer 
assumes that the distribution of effort in a type depends on the type itself. The amount of effort 
an individual invests would determine the outcome for that individual. Here, the only variable 
within an individual’s control is his or her effort; autonomous choice decides the position of a 
person on the effort distribution.  
Formally, let 𝒯 =  {𝑇1, 𝑇2, … , 𝑇𝑛}  be the set of types (assumed to be finite), where each 
𝑇𝑖 = (𝑡1, 𝑡2, … , 𝑡𝑚) is a vector of 𝑚 factors determining a circumstance (we also assume that the 
factors are finite). Each 𝑇𝑖 consists of all individuals with the same circumstances. Each 𝑇𝑖 has a 
different distribution of effort. 
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An example would help clarify Roemer’s model. Suppose there are only two factors in 
our analysis: wealth and innate intelligence. Since these factors are beyond the control of any 
subject, they are deemed circumstance factors. Each factor has two levels: high and low. With 
this setup, there are four types of people: wealthy – more intelligent, poor – more intelligent, 
wealthy – less intelligent, and poor – less intelligent. With the requirement of Roemer’s model, 
each type needs to have enough subjects for a viable distribution of effort. In this simple setting 
with very few factors, this requirement is easily met. Note that autonomy is satisfied by the 
assumption that each individual in our hypothetical population can control how much effort he or 
she exerts for different endeavors. 
From the point of view of formal notation, this example means that there are two factors:  
𝑡1 represents wealth, where 𝑡1 =  {ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑙𝑜𝑤}, and 
𝑡2 represents intelligence, where 𝑡2 = {ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑙𝑜𝑤}. 
The set of types is  
𝒯 =  { 𝑇1 = (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑙𝑜𝑤), 𝑇2 = (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ), 𝑇3 = (𝑙𝑜𝑤, ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ), 𝑇4 = (𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝑙𝑜𝑤)}. 
Roemer emphasizes an important distinction between the level of effort and the degree of 
effort. The level of effort is the net effort an individual expends compared to the total population, 
while the degree of effort is the amount of effort expended relative to a particular type. With this 
framework, Roemer proposes that equality of opportunity should satisfy the following condition:  
the reward of the individual be the same across all types as long as he or she exerts the same 
degree of effort (in his work, he specifies it as individuals with the same centiles in their types). 
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This criterion means that no matter what the background of a person is, the reward should only 
depend on his or her effort. This ideal would be attained by redistribution. Roemer acknowledges 
that, in general, it would not be possible to attain a redistribution scheme such that all people 
with the same centile across groups would have the same reward; but there are designs that 
approximate this ideal case (which is not the interest of this essay). 
To continue our current example, let’s consider the amount of hours spent for studying 
per day as an outcome. It suffices to demonstrate the idea on two types; without loss of 
generality, we choose the wealthy – more intelligent and poor – less intelligent types (types 𝑇2, 
and 𝑇4, respectively). The 𝑇2 type has a distribution of effort ranging from 5 to 8 hours, with the 
median effort of 6 (say, because people in this type are well-prepared by family financial 
resources and are fond of studying since they are naturally good at academic work). The 𝑇4 type 
has a distribution of effort ranging from 3 to 5 hours, with the median effort of 4 (say, because 
they have to work part-time, and are not fond of studying due to their less elevated academic 
ability). If we compare students of these two types who stand at the median of their group, the 
level of effort might be different (6 vs 4), but their degree of effort is the same (they are both 
50th percentile in their groups). In Roemer’s model, it is unfair to hold the person in the 𝑇4 type 
accountable for doing less work than the one in the 𝑇2 type because the effort distribution is 
beyond any individual’s control. 
The main contribution of this model is the metric of effort as a way to determine equality 
of opportunity. According to Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014), De Barros et al. (2009) use another 
related metric to determine equality of opportunity, but the main assumption also lies on the 
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separation of circumstances and effort. We shall discuss this empirical study briefly later on 
since it motivates some interesting inquiry to Roemer’s model. 
1.2 Ex Ante and Ex Post Utility - Where Roemer’s Model Stands 
 While Roemer’s model provides a useful way to define equality of opportunity, it does 
not view opportunity in the context of interconnected generations. Since parents are responsible 
for creating an environment for children to grow up (that is, they affect the circumstances of 
their children), equality of opportunity should be examined in a multi-generational context. To 
this end, we turn briefly to a discussion of social welfare distribution: the ex ante and ex post 
perspectives. As we will see, this discussion provides a bridge between equality of opportunity 
and mobility. We adopt the summary from Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014) for this debate, and we 
provide a discussion on how to view the debate from the perspective of Roemer model. 
Ex Ante and Ex Post - Some Concepts 
According to Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014), ex ante utility refers to the utility before an 
event and ex post utility refers to the utility after an event. An event can be any decision an agent 
undertakes, be it choosing a job or buying a house. Ex ante and ex post equality can be 
understood in the same manner.  
Kanbur and Wagstaff use Milton Friedman’s (1962) case to illustrate the point. Friedman 
considers a case where two people with equal resources and circumstances enter a lottery. While 
both are free to enter the lottery, the outcome of the lottery is very unequal, one favorable and 
one not. Friedman argues that even if there is an inequality of outcome after the lottery takes 
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place, there should be no redistribution intervention since doing so means tampering with the 
freedom of the agents to enter the lottery from the outset. Authors such as Kanbur (1982) and 
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Walton (2007) argue that there still should be redistribution even in 
the ex post inequality case. They believe that extreme ex post inequality creates a moral 
obligation for society to alleviate the results. In the current example, supposing one agent 
receives next to nothing, while the other receives millions of dollars when the circumstances of 
both are equal before the lottery, then it is necessary that the “loser” should at least receive some 
benefit if the situation pushes him or her to poverty or starvation. Generally accepted moral 
principles would prevent us from not redistributing even if it means violating the ex ante equality 
situation. 
It is easy to see that this simple case can be extended to more realistic situations, because 
essentially, when people go through life, they often have to enter a multitude of lottery. The 
point this case illustrates is the possibility of the coexistence of ex ante equality and ex post 
inequality, when chance and preference towards risk are involved. Thus, when we observe ex 
post inequality, it does not imply that there is no ex ante equality. In practice, however, 
inequality might arise both before and after the event. 
This ex ante and ex post inequality problem is very important for mobility since it is the 
link between equality of opportunity and mobility. The complication comes when we view two 
consecutive generations, since the outcome of the first generation constitutes the initial resources 
of the second generation. If we are to choose the ex ante equality standpoint, then we are facing a 
second generation with potentially unequal opportunity (supposing that attitudes towards risk are 
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different across people in the first generation and that chance plays a role in the outcome). To 
maintain equality of opportunity for this second generation, there must be some redistribution, 
but that in turn violates our assumption of equality of opportunity for the first generation, as 
Friedman has claimed. This logical incompatibility of the ex ante strand means that the ex post 
view is preferable. 
Roemer’s model can be viewed from both the ex ante and ex post perspective by linking 
two generations. By requiring that the outcomes of each effort centile for different types be the 
same, Roemer is applying ex post equality as a way to define his equality of opportunity theory. 
This is because in Roemer’s model, we take for granted circumstance vectors, and only 
redistribute after the event. This is essentially opposed to the view of Friedman, who maintains 
that there should be no redistribution.  
The ex ante and ex post perspective also helps clarify one problem that can happen in 
Roemer’s model, the case of redistribution among people within the same type who exert the 
same amount of effort. Without loss of generality, consider two people in the same type both of 
whom exert the same amount of effort (at least if we use “centile” as a way to rank effort). Now, 
since these people are not identical, chances are that their propensity for risk is different, which 
mean they might end up with different outcomes. Even if their risk tolerance is the same, 
“chance” can get in the way and still make them achieve different outcomes1. According to 
Roemer’s model, then, they should both receive the same compensation by redistribution since 
their efforts are the same (in this case, since both persons are in the same type, their degrees of 
                                                          
1 We are taking a non-deterministic view of the world, as in everything can be affected by “chance”. Our 
definitions are rather loose; we avoid delving into the realm of philosophy on determinism. 
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effort and levels of effort are identical, respectively). The ex ante and ex post perspectives 
informs us that in Roemer’s model, we still need redistribution even if people are in the same 
type with the same levels of effort. 
Limitations 
 Approaching equality of opportunity from the ex post utility perspective is not without 
its drawbacks. If we rejects the notion of ex ante equality due to our compromise position in 
order to curb extreme outcomes, we have to take into account the incentive effect: people might 
be aware of redistribution, and they might lower their effort to attain the desired benefits. For 
example, a very self-driven person who is also born in a very favorable family might be 
discouraged if she knows that the reward of her work is going to be equal to that of her peer, who 
tries as hard, but whose the level of effort is much lower than hers. Roemer is aware of this issue 
and he argues that the redistribution policy is designed to maximize effort for the disadvantaged 
group, not to maximize the average effort. Also, he proposes that there are alternatives for policy 
design that achieve this goal. For the purpose of this essay, we are not going too deep into that 
direction. For now, we explore another view of equality that helps shedding light on Roemer’s 
model. 
1.3 How Roemer’s Model Fits into the Rawls and Nozick Debate on 
Distribution 
In the prior section, we observed that there are two main reasons to take an ex post point 
of view when it comes to redistribution: the logical incompatibility of the ex ante position in a 
multigenerational context, and the moral obligation against extreme social outcomes due to mere 
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chances. As far as we have seen, Roemer’s model is compatible with the ex post position. Since 
Roemer’s model argues for redistribution to attain equality of opportunity, it would be useful to 
ask where the model stands in the debate between Rawls and Nozick on redistributive justice. 
The Basics of Rawls and Nozick’s Theories   
Rawls uses a thought experiment of rational actors who would approach the problem of 
justice from a perspective where they don’t know their exact identity or the conditions of the 
society that they are to live in: as Rawls puts it, they operate from behind a “veil of ignorance.” 
Since they don’t know exactly where their advantages and disadvantages are, to maximize their 
self-interest, these actors have to agree on a social system where basic rights are guaranteed. 
Rawls separates justice into two principles:  
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and 
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this 
scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their 
fair value. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be 
attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged 
members of society. (Rawls, 1993) 
Accordingly, the first principle deals with basic liberty and is inalienable for each person; 
the second one deals with social and economic equality. The first one has priority over the other 
principle. A just society in Rawls’ view is thus a redistributive one, so that everyone has basic 
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rights and opportunities. This does not entail equality of all resources. In fact, from Rawls’ point 
of view, inequality can exist when the purpose is to better the conditions of the least advantaged. 
Nozick holds the entitlement theory perspective. Accordingly, there are three principles: 
1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in 
transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. (Nozick, 
1974) 
In this theory, Nozick focuses on the process by which property is acquired. Nozick 
claims that as long as inequality does not violate any of these principles, it is acceptable. When 
any of the principles is infringed upon, there should be compensation for disadvantaged groups. 
Nozick thus favors reparations if there is injustice; he opposes Rawls’ idea of redistribution to 
benefit the least advantaged. If the condition of the least advantaged person in Nozick’s world is 
not a result of prior injustice, there should be no action to alleviate the condition. 
In mainstream economic and political debate, Rawls’ theory is championed by the left, 
and Nozick’s by the right. Nozick opposes Rawls’ view because he thinks it implies that the 
government has to constantly interfere with people’s lives by implementing redistribution 
policies (Phillips, 1977). Proponents of Nozick’s view often favor market forces as a way to 
gauge inequality. Proponents of Rawls’ theory, on the other hand, claim that the root of injustice 
cannot be traced, and redistribution is crucial to level the playing field (Srinvasan, 2013).  
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On the one hand, Roemer’s model leans towards the left side, politically, since it argues 
for a redistribution policy for each generation, according to circumstances (aiming to level the 
playing field). On the other hand, the model also takes into account the process of acquiring 
holding, because redistribution depends on effort. However, since compensation in Roemer’s 
model only depends on the degree of effort within each type (determined by circumstances), it 
does not entirely agree with the principle of free-exchange in Nozick’s theory. For example, 
inheritance would only count as a circumstantial factor, and thus would not place a big role on 
compensation in Roemer’s model. Yet, if free-exchange comes from an effort of a salesman to 
advertise his or her goods, for instance, then it can be counted towards compensation. On a 
spectrum of left to right in the Rawls and Nozick debate, Roemer’s model can be considered as 
occupying the moderate left. 
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1.4 Preferences Versus Resources View  
 Another view of equality of opportunity that would shed light on Roemer’s model is the 
view using preferences and resources (as opposed to using circumstances and efforts, as in 
Roemer’s model). In this section, by using preference as a medium to explain effort levels, we 
point out two main problems with Roemer’s model: the separability of circumstance and effort, 
and the limited application of the model on certain life periods. Kanbur and Wagstaff (2014) 
attribute this preferences and resources view to Dworkin’s attempt to introduce responsibility to 
egalitarian philosophy. In a nutshell, the main idea is that inequality due to resources is 
unacceptable, yet inequality due to preference is acceptable. Dworkin claims that people should 
be responsible for the preferences that they are glad to have. Just as in Roemer’s case, this 
standpoint requires a separation of preference and resource. The question is: what if resource 
helps shape preferences? A lavish lifestyle or a frugal lifestyle could well be a result of the 
resources surrounding a person as he or she grows up. If the separation of resource from 
preference is dubious, then it is hard to trace if a person should be responsible for his or her 
preference.  
 A small excursion to the empirical realm would shed further light on the problems with 
Roemer’s model. The studies from Barros et al (2009) on inequality of opportunity in Latin 
America and the Caribbean adopt a framework very similar to Roemer’s theoretical model while 
also using the concept of preference. In this study, circumstances are chosen as factors beyond 
people’s control (gender, race or ethnicity, birthplace, educational attainment of mother, 
educational achievement of father, etc.). People are then arranged into “types” (as defined above 
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in Roemer’s model). Outcomes (access to education, safe water, vaccinations, etc.) are then 
incorporated to calculate the probability for each types to deviate from the average outcomes of 
the population. The key assumption here is that children’s outcomes result from circumstances, 
rather than from their preferences. 
Barros et al.’s assumption is not unreasonable. For example, small children do not have 
any say in whether they should eat healthily, stay in a safe environment (to avoid cigarette smoke 
or potential physical accidents, etc.), or to spend time studying. Their behaviors are shaped by 
the effort that their parents impose upon them. The only factors affecting children’s 
“preferences” are resources (which can be arranged by parents’ preferences as well) and chance. 
One might argue that there is some inner force coming from a child that eventually forms his or 
her preference, but before the child is able to make decisions of his or her own will, nothing can 
influence him or her, except for resources. This conclusion that resources influence preferences, 
even partially, is inevitable unless one assumes to the contrary that even infants have free will to 
choose a way to react to outer environment in the first place. While research in childhood 
psychology and neurology would help us make a better judgement on which assumption to 
follow, with common sense, Barros et al.’s assumption seems reasonable. 
 This key assumption on children’s inability to have effort forces an inquiry into the heart 
of Roemer’s model. Rather than using “preference” and “resource,” in Roemer’s model we deal 
with “circumstance” and “effort.” The important question is this: if we consider the very 
beginning part of a child’s life, is the Roemer model still applicable?  
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Supposing Roemer’s model can be applied to this period, then, it is reasonable to use the 
assumption in Barros et al.: children have no say over their effort. In other words, all children’s 
effort can be assumed to be zero across all types. The issue here is similar to the problem 
mentioned above: if children have no say in what they want to do, then how can we have a 
distribution of effort for each type? Roemer’s model does not deal with this issue at all since it 
assumes the existence of effort from the outset. With this similarly defined level of zero effort 
across types for each child, then there should be equal redistribution for each and every child. 
 Now, supposing the Roemer model cannot be applied to the very early stage of life, then 
it means that there exists some period where we can’t separate “circumstance” and “effort.” For 
Roemer’s model to work for other periods besides this particular one, naturally, there must be a 
moment in life that signifies the inception of autonomy2, which allows us to separate 
circumstance and effort. How should we determine this autonomy formation point? This 
question is hard to answer, both conceptually and empirically. It is unclear for now how we 
should agree on forming this crucial autonomy formation point. The main problem with 
Roemer’s model lies in the assumption that circumstance and effort are distinct.  
 But, the matter does not stop there: supposing we can divide people’s lives into non-
autonomous and autonomous periods, why should we stop dividing the autonomous period into 
sub-periods when using Roemer’s model? This question does not aim to complicate the issue by 
disregarding the model. Rather, we are looking at “effort” in a more realistic and, arguably, more 
progressive manner. If we treat the redistribution mechanism using one period of life only, we 
                                                          
2 Autonomy can be understood as the ability to make one’s own decisions in this context. 
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are assuming that effort distribution is unchanged throughout life. This idea is troublesome since 
effort might change over time. A person’s attitude towards work in his or her teenage years is 
drastically different from that in adult years. Using “average” effort of life for purposes of 
redistribution entails over-penalizing “low effort” periods in early years, when effort is still 
highly dependent on circumstances outside of one’s control. Ultimately, the heart of the problem 
lies in the imperfect separation of circumstance from effort: we can at most assume that they are 
separable in certain periods, but we need to deal with the untidy details of the dynamic 
interaction between all periods, especially in the formative early years of life. 
 While it is interesting, the dynamic interaction of circumstance and effort (or between 
preference and resources, if one looks at equality of opportunity from that view) pertains to a 
separate discipline (possibly psychology, neurology, sociology and related fields). For the 
purpose of economics, it is sufficient for now to acknowledge that we have to separate a lifetime 
into appropriate periods to counter the negative effects of circumstance on effort distribution 
when applying Roemer’s model. This normative measure by no means assumes that it is socially 
preferable for a distribution of effort to be skewed to higher level. What should be striven for is 
the avoidance of a correlation between negative circumstances and a negatively skewed 
distribution of effort. In simple terms, we should try to avoid situations where people are born in 
very disadvantaged positions and the general level of effort of that type is too low compared to 
the general effort level of other types. For example, while it is questionable if it is better for a 
society in which everyone is working a sixty-hour work week (even if they all want to), it is 
definitely undesirable for a society to be one in which everyone is homeless and spends little 
time working productively. The homeless population is not necessarily responsible for their 
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“laziness”; they might be too sick – or too discouraged, have behavioral problem, or be unable to 
attain skill sets demanded by the labor market. 
1.5 Conclusion 
This section introduced Roemer’s model as a way to view equality of opportunity. By using 
“effort” as the main determinant for rewards, the model aims to bypass the differences in 
circumstances of different people in a population while still comparing their effort with their 
peers’ in the same type. The model shares a similar point of view with the ex post equality 
perspective. In the debate on redistributive justice between Rawls and Nozick, Roemer’s model 
leans towards the politically liberal view of Rawls, as opposed to the libertarian view of Nozick. 
Though there are different limitations, it can be argued that Roemer’s model can be applied to 
the early childhood period with the crucial assumption that each child exerts zero effort for his or 
her outcomes. The implication of this assumption is that in a world of equal opportunity, even 
after we take into account effort levels, each child should receive an equal amount of reward for 
each outcome category, be it health, education, or consumption. As we will see later on, this 
theoretical implication and other results from empirical research on early childhood development 
will strongly suggest that we focus on early childhood period to curb inequality and promote 
equality of opportunity.  
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ESSAY 2  
The Big Picture: The Facts of Inequality 
and Mobility 
In the prior essay, we discussed Roemer’s model of equality of opportunity and issues 
related to it. Implementing this model of equality of opportunity is by no means easy, not only 
because of the conceptual difficulty, but also because of the state of inequality and mobility3. In 
this essay, we leave behind the theoretical discussion of equality of opportunity to focus on the 
state of inequality and cross-generation mobility across the world. By doing so, not only will we 
understand how far apart the equality of opportunity literature and the inequality and mobility 
literature are, but we will also see a theoretical gap within the latter that will eventually lead us to 
the third essay on the mechanisms that create inequality.  
We start by surveying income and wealth inequality trends since the early twentieth 
century (section 2.1). Within this context of the state of inequality, we attempt to observe how 
generations fare differently. After that, we examine two consecutive generations – the study of 
intergenerational mobility – and then we briefly talk about multiple generations – the social 
mobility theory (section 2.2). In section 2.3, we present a discussion on how the different 
branches of research fit together and how they as a whole miss an important aspect that relates to 
opportunity.  
                                                          
3 “Inequality” and “mobility” are used in general terms, not limited to dimensions such as income or wealth. We 
adopt this meaning throughout the essay, unless stated otherwise. 
 23 
 
2.1 Trends of income and wealth inequality 
To understand intergenerational mobility, it is useful to start with the current state of 
inequality. A picture of income and wealth inequality today would inform us of the prospect of 
mobility for the current generation: how much does a person have to earn and own to be better 
off than his or her parents? In a relative way, standard of living depends on inequality. Not only 
does John Doe want to earn twice (say) his father or mother’s income when he reaches a certain 
age, but he also wants to be ranked higher on the income and wealth ladder compared to his 
parents’ rank (or at least not worse off)4. 
Since income and wealth inequality is itself a big topic within the discipline of 
economics, we have to limit the scope of our discussion. We only survey some stylized facts of 
inequality trends for the U.S. and some European countries, namely France and Sweden. We 
choose these three main countries because, as we will see later in the third essay when we reach 
the literature on the mechanisms of intergenerational mobility, a large body of research comes 
from the U.S. and Sweden (a typical representation of Nordic countries). As for France, it is a 
typical example of non-Nordic European countries, a region too important to leave out. In 
addition, these three countries represent the three main groups of developed countries that have 
different levels of inequality, from low to high. Due to the scope of the project, we limit the 
discussion to these developed countries. However, although our treatment is not all-
encompassing, it by no means omits important issues. 
                                                          
4 This cannot be achieved by everybody at the same time since, by definition, when some people move “up”, some 
must move “down”, relatively speaking. 
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While many scholars have attempted to work on income and wealth inequality, perhaps 
the source of research with the longest range of historical data is that of Thomas Piketty, 
Anthony Atkinson, Emmanuel Saez and their associates. By using historical tax data, the team of 
researchers created a rich historical dataset of the share of top income earners in more than 
twenty countries, dating as far back as the late nineteenth century (The World Top Income 
Database, 2015). There are two main reasons to focus on the share of income of top earners. 
First, by looking at the evolution of the share of income for the top earners, we can deduce the 
trend of the share of income for the rest. Second, historically, universal income tax records were 
not available until a certain point; before that, only the richest were required to file tax records. 
While we also use some other sources to illustrate inequality in the U.S., for other countries, we 
will rely mostly on historical data from the World Top Income Database (WTID). 
Income Inequality 
For the U.S., besides the estimated data from Piketty-Saez, another source of historical 
data is from the Congressional Budget Office Average Household Income and Federal Taxes by 
Income Group. Generally, the pattern of the share of top income (the top 10% and higher) 
followed a U-shaped curve over time. It went down from the early twentieth century to about 
World War II, stayed stable until the 1970s, and went up from then (WTID, 2015) (See Figure 
1). The growth rates of income for the top income cohorts are larger than the income growth 
rates of the lower and middle income cohorts, especially since the 1970s (See Figure 2). When 
viewed in a long-term historical context, income concentration at the very top (the top 0.5% and 
1%) has returned to the levels of the 1920s, a period with various class and political conflicts 
(Stone, Trisi, Sherman, DeBot, 2015; Piketty, 2006).  
 25 
 
Figure 1 
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While income inequality in the U.S. has been increasing in recent years, the situation is 
quite different in European countries. In France, for example, the trend of income inequality was 
similar to that of the U.S. up until WWII – the share of the top income cohort decreased. After 
the war, however, the share of the top 10% slightly increased until the 1960s, where it slightly 
diminished and has stabilized since the 1980s (See Figure 3). The top 1% earners and higher 
have seen their share of income mostly remain unchanged since the end of the WWII. The main 
difference between France and the U.S. is that the top share of income in France is not 
expanding: inequality is held at bay, at least from the view of the top (See Figure 4). Indeed, in 
his bestseller Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty claims that the strong increasing 
inequality in the past few decades is an “Anglo-Saxon” phenomenon since Britain also exhibits 
the same pattern as the U.S. (Piketty, 2014). 
As for Sweden, between the beginning of the twentieth century and the 1990s, the share 
of the top income steadily decreased. Though it has come back recently, influenced by the 
market liberalization across the world, the share of the top 10% in Sweden is still less than 30%, 
the mark which France has barely touched since the beginning of the last century (See Figure 3 
and Figure 4). Sweden is among the most egalitarian of the Nordic countries. 
Commenting on the phenomenon of the rapid increase of income inequality in the U.S., 
Piketty suggests that part of the cause is the ability of super management to increase their 
compensation. He notes that the phenomenon is specific to the U.S. and Britain since the top 
CEOs of these countries are highly rewarded, unlike their counterparts in Europe (Piketty, 2014). 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
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Wealth inequality 
Unlike income inequality, which can be calculated using tax data, there is no direct data 
for wealth inequality because people are generally not required to declare how much they own. 
Estimation of the historical evolution of wealth share at the top is often projected from estate tax 
data, survey data, and lists of wealthy individuals (Saez and Zucman, 2015). Despite their 
imperfection, these estimates provide us with a general picture of how much the top owns over 
time. 
Saez and Zucman (2015) use capitalized income data from income tax returns and data 
from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds to estimate the evolution of wealth in the U.S. from 
1913 to 2013. They find that the concentration of wealth has returned to its high levels of the 
1920s. Particularly, the top 0.1% has recently owned more than 20% of the total wealth in the 
U.S. (the highest level was 25% in the 1920s), up from about 10% in the years following World 
War II (See Figure 5). They note, however, that in recent decades, not all people at the top have 
seen their share of wealth increase. The wealth of the next 0.9% has remained stable, while the 
9% below the top 1% actually have seen their fortune shrink slightly.  
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Figure 5 
 
Source: Saez and Zucman (2014). 
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Figure 6 
 
For the bottom 90%, their wealth share started increasing in the mid-1920s, reached a 
peak in the 1980s, and collapsed dramatically in recent decades (See Figure 6). It should be 
noted that not only did the share of wealth of the bottom 90% decrease in the past few decades, 
the level of average wealth also decreased. The stark state of inequality can be seen when the 
average wealth of the top 1% and the bottom 90% are juxtaposed in one graph (See Figure 7). 
Source: Saez and Zucman (2014). 
The share of total U.S. wealth owned by the bottom 90% of families, 1917 - 2012 
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Figure 7 
 
Wealth inequality in Europe is less extreme than the wealth inequality in the U.S. 
According to the two graphs extracted from Piketty (2014) (See Figure 8 Error! Reference 
source not found.and Figure 9), we can see that both France and Sweden have the same pattern 
of top wealth share since the beginning of the twentieth century. Wealth shares of the top 10% 
and 1% decreased up to around 1970, and the shares then stabilized for France and slightly 
increased for Sweden. As a point of comparison, note that in France and Sweden, it takes the 
entire top 1% to own about 20% of the total wealth; while in the U.S., just one-tenth of the top 
1% owns more than 20% of the total wealth (See Figure 5). 
Source: Saez and Zucman (2014). 
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Figure 8 
 
Figure 9 
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The trends of income and wealth inequality presented above help explain why the general 
population is concerned about the prospect of mobility. When income and wealth are so 
concentrated in one generation, it is very likely that the cohorts that possess the majority of the 
wealth will pass along their fortunes to their children. The more capital one owns, the more one 
has to give to descendants. With this common sense, it follows that the difference in the degree 
of inequality of the U.S., France and Sweden (in increasing order) should lead to less mobility in 
the U.S., moderate mobility in France, and high mobility in Sweden. Often, when there is 
extreme inequality and low mobility, the political environment is quite unstable due to social 
unrest. Indeed, we are reaching the level of inequality of the early twentieth century, the period 
with political turmoil that led to World War I.  
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2.2 Intergenerational Mobility 
There are two separate ways to look at mobility: mobility within a lifetime, and 
intergenerational mobility. The former deals with how one person can improve his or her 
outcomes from early life to later life. The latter deals with how descendant generation(s) fare in 
comparison with the original generation. Mathematical measurements for the former are more 
complicated than those of the latter. While mobility within a lifetime is interesting, within the 
scope of our project, we only focus on intergenerational mobility. 
2.2.1 Methodologies and their issues 
Black and Devereux (2010) mention two major measures of earnings mobility: the 
intergenerational elasticity (IGE) and the intergenerational correlation. The IGE is the coefficient 
𝛽 of the regression: 
log(𝑦1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log(𝑦0) + 𝜖, 
where 𝑦 is the permanent income, the subscript 1 refers to the child, and the subscript 0 refers to 
the parent. 𝛽 shows the predictability of a child’s income when we know his or her parent’s 
income.  
The intergenerational correlation is: 
𝜌 = (
𝜎1
𝜎0
) 𝛽, 
where 𝜎 is the standard deviation of log income.  
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While there is no theoretical reason to prefer one measure to another, the IGE has the 
advantage of not being “biased by classical measurement error, and so it is often easier to 
estimate with real world data” (Black and Devereux, 2010). It is also highlighted in the literature 
review by Black and Devereux (2010).  
Besides the IGE and the intergenerational correlation, researchers also rely on the 
transition matrices (or mobility matrices) to study intergenerational mobility. Transition matrices 
provide “quantiles of the child’s earnings conditional on the parent’s earnings quantile” (Black 
and Devereux, 2010). Often, it can be interpreted as a table showing the probability of a child 
ending up in different earnings quantiles, based on the quantiles that his or her parents were in. 
This method provides a general view of the distribution of the whole population coming from 
families of different quantiles, rather than just one group.  
Methodological Issues 
There are some technical problems in estimating the IGE. Black and Devereux (2010) 
quote several theoretical and empirical works and categorize the kinds of problems into 
persistent transitory shocks, age use of fathers and sons, and lifecycle bias. Due to the 
complicated econometrics nature of these issues, which is beyond this project, we gloss over the 
results, rather than discuss deeper technical details. However, to measure IGE, the incomes of 
fathers and sons must be permanent income. This requires averaging income over many years as 
well as choosing an appropriate age to record incomes. The simulation by Mazumder (2010) 
shows that in the case of the U.S., a large value of average time is required to measure IGE. This 
is a contrast to the Norwegian case, where Nilsen et al (2008) find that increasing the time of 
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fathers’ earnings does not influence IGE as much, possibly due to lower transitory shocks in the 
Norwegian case. Overall, the main point is that an accurate estimation of IGE is hard to achieve 
because of persistent transitory shocks. 
As for the ages of fathers and sons used to measure income, Haider and Solon (2006) 
demonstrate by a simple model that when using the earning of one period as an estimator for 
lifetime earnings, some years work better than others. The model shows that IGE suffers from 
attenuation bias, which in turn depends on the father’s age. Baker and Solon (2003) and 
Mazumder (2005) demonstrate that the bias of IGE in general is not limited to attenuation bias, 
and the size of the bias also depends on the son’s age.  
For lifecycle bias, when measuring sons and fathers’ yearly earnings by regressing over 
lifetime earnings, the coefficients of lifetime earning might be different in different years5. 
Haider and Solon (2006) and Bohlmark and Lindquist (2006) use historical earning data in the 
U.S. and Sweden, respectively, and find that the estimates of the coefficient vary significantly 
over a lifetime. In particular, for sons, estimates of the coefficient have a high growth before age 
30, peak and stabilize in 30s and 40s, and gradually decline in late 50s. This means that a large 
attenuation bias is underway if the analysis includes earnings data of sons under age 30. The case 
is also similar with the coefficient of fathers’ earnings. Grawe (2006) provides consistent 
                                                          
5 For example, assume earnings for father or son is measured at a particular age a, then the equation used 
is: 𝑦0𝑎 =  𝜇𝑎𝑦0 +  𝑣,  
where 0 refers to the father generation, 𝑎 is the age of the father when earnings is measured, 𝑦0 is 
permanent earnings, and 𝑣 is the deviation between permanent earning and measured earning. 
Life cycle bias might happens when 𝜇𝑎 takes different values at different years. An analogous situation 
can happen for the equation for the son’s generation. Consult Black and Devereux (2010) for a more 
detailed model. 
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evidence of the lifecycle bias. Using estimates from 20 studies with different datasets from 
different countries, he finds strong evidence that there is a negative correlation between the 
father’s age and IGE. Other studies by Reville (1995) and Nilsen et al (2008) also show that 
lifecycle bias is present in estimating IGE. 
Black and Devereux (2010) note that there are also some problems when using transition 
matrices to study mobility. The first is the arbitrary choice to separate the population into 
quantiles rather than other groups (quartiles, for example). Some researchers such as 
Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2008) propose a measure of upward mobility by calculating the 
chance the son is ranked higher than father in earnings. However, this method overemphasizes 
small change (for example, moving 1 percentile up across generations is the same as moving 20 
percentiles up). In addition, transition matrices suffer the same problems with the IGE when it 
comes to how to measure the “permanent” earnings. 
2.2.2 Empirical Results 
Before we survey the empirical results of intergenerational mobility research, it is 
important to acknowledge two issues with the data. First, as noted in both Corak (2005) and 
Wolff (2009), some of the survey data about the prior generation’s income or wealth depended 
on “recall” data: survey participants were asked to estimate their parents’ earnings when they 
were at the participants’ age. Though there is some validity in this form of survey, the method is 
vulnerable to significant errors. Second, other research studies depend on longitudinal data, 
which makes it hard to estimate “lifetime earnings”. In particular, when we vary the time used to 
calculate earnings, the IGE changes dramatically.  
 38 
 
In the empirical literature using the methods discussed above, income is the main 
dimension utilized. In this section, we also focus on this dimension, starting with the U.S. 
Results for the U.S 
For the U.S., most studies use datasets containing both parents’ and children’s 
information. The main idea is to separate the data into father-child pairs and analyze their 
respective dimensions. Here, we draw from the literature review in Wolff (2009) and provide 
some updates.  
Recall from the prior section that IGE (or 𝛽) provides the level of predictability of a 
child’s income when his or her parents’ income is known. The higher 𝛽 is, the lower the mobility 
of a society is. Empirical studies show that the IGEs across countries lie between 0 and 1 (Corak, 
2006). According to Wolff (2009), early studies of intergenerational mobility such as that of 
Becker and Tomes (1979) show low IGE, at the level of 0.15. But later studies such as that of 
Mazumder (2005) show that low results come from large measurement errors. After correcting 
for these errors, the level is at about 0.3 to 0.4. Solon (1992) uses Panel of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) data and different ways to define a father’s earnings, using averages from different 
numbers of years; he finds that the higher the number of years used, the higher the IGE – up to 
0.41 when it comes to a 5-year average. Zimmerman (1992) uses data from the National 
Longitudinal Survey (NLS), and finds that IGE is about 0.4. Mazumder (2005) uses the U.S. 
Social Security Administration longitudinal earning files, and argues that the large year coverage 
of the dataset allows for a good estimation of permanent earnings. In particular, when the 16-
year average income is used, the IGE is about 0.65. 
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Rather than estimating IGE using the income of all fathers without categorizing them into 
different groups, Hertz (2005) looks at different cohorts of the income distribution and calculates 
IGE for each cohort. The general IGE is about 0.42, but the probability of coming from and 
staying in the same cohort is higher for the top and bottom cohorts. The effect is particularly high 
for blacks, as compared to whites. Hertz (2006) uses transition matrices to show the probability 
of people moving across quintiles (See Table 1) with the data coming from PSID. The bottom 
and top quintiles show significant “stickiness;” children born into a particular cohort tend to stay 
within that cohort when they grow up, with the probability 41.5% and 51.1%, for the bottom and 
top quintiles respectively. The middle cohorts have less extreme distribution, but still, one’s 
chance of staying within one’s parents’ cohort is higher than moving to other cohorts. The author 
also notes that there is a large and significant difference between black and white cohorts. 
Table 1 
Source: Herzt (2006) - Center for American Progress. 
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An updated study by Auten, Gee and Turner (2013), using transition matrices and data 
from Statistics of Income and IRS Compliance Data (covering different time periods), shows 
slight differences from Hertz (2006) (See Table 2). The probability of staying within the cohort 
one was born into is generally lower. The probability of staying within a cohort is high for the 
bottom and top quintiles, about 30% for the lowest quintile and 40% for the highest quintile. In 
particular, the probability for a child born into the top 1% family to stay in the highest quintile is 
very high, 57.2%.  
Table 2 
Source: Auten, Gee and Turner (2013). 
Another branch of studies tries to capture trends in intergenerational mobility. These 
studies measure the IGE across different cohorts born in different years and observe the trend of 
IGE. Data pertaining to these cohorts are taken from different datasets. Below, we present a table 
summarizing the articles cited in Wolff (2009). 
Probability of attaining each income quintiles, top 10% and top 1% 
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Table 3 
Summary of IGE trends by different studies 
Studies Cohort (birth year of sons) (IGE)   Data source Conclusion on IGE 
over time 
Levine and 
Mazumder 
(2002) 
1940 – 1956 (0.12) 
1951 – 1966 (0.49) 
General Social 
Survey (GSS) 
Increasing IGE 
 1944 – 1952 (0.23) 
1957 – 1965 (0.33) 
 
National 
Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) 
Increasing IGE  
 1946 – 1954 (0.45 – married 
parents) (0.37 – general) 
1957 – 1965 (0.29 – married 
parents) (0.29 – general) 
PSID Decreasing IGE 
Hauser (1998) Four cohorts between  
1922 – 1963 
GSS No discernable pattern 
Fertig (2003) Five cohorts between  
1945 – 1972 (0.50 to 0.22) 
PSID Decreasing IGE 
Mayer and 
Lopoo (2005) 
Continuous time trend data 
1949 – 1952 (0.35) 
1953 – 1956 (0.47) 
1962 – 1965 (0.28) 
PSID Increasing and then 
decreasing. Changes 
are not statistically 
significant. 
Lee and Solon 
(2009) 
(Covers both sons and daughters, 
defines income as family 
income. Unlike other papers, 
IGE is calculated for each year – 
continuous time trend). 
Sons:  
1977 – 1982 – 1990 (0.34 – 0.52 
– 0.36) 
Daughters: 
1977 – 1985 – 2000 (0.05 – 0.53 
– 0.46) 
 
 
PSID No particular up or 
down trend 
Aaronson and 
Mazumder 
(2008) 
1940 - 2000 Match U.S. 
decennial Census 
Data with 
“synthetic” 
parents of the 
earlier 
Mobility was low in 
1940, increased to 
1980, then decreased 
sharply in 1980s and 
steadily until 1990s. 
Suggests that mobility 
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generation. in 2000 was as low as 
in 1940. 
 
In general, the research results of earning mobility in the U.S are quite inconsistent. The 
consensus is that when lifetime earning is estimated by multiple years, the IGE goes up. The 
level of IGE varies around 0.40 to 0.60, depending on the data used, the birth year covered, the 
cohort surveyed, and the methodology adopted. Trends of IGE are ambiguous; some studies even 
show contradictory results for groups born in the same years when two different datasets are 
analyzed. We should note that these results are ambiguous or contradicting because data for both 
parents and children are limited (statistical agencies started collecting longitudinal data in the 
1960s) and often estimation is accompanied by large errors. As more longitudinal data are 
collected, more precise conclusions will be available.  
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International Comparisons 
According to Wolff (2009), there have been several attempts to compare IGE across 
countries. Solon (2002) presents a report on the estimates of IGE from six different advanced 
economies, using data from the 1990s. Corak (2006) provides a different study with nine 
different countries. The general pattern is that English-speaking countries -particularly the U.S. 
and the U.K. - have a high IGE. They are followed by European countries, and then 
Scandinavian countries. The exception in North America is Canada, whose IGE is at the level of 
its Scandinavian counterparts. Corak’s (2006) table is reproduced below: 
Table 4 
 
Country Father – Son earnings elasticity 
Denmark 0.15 
Norway 0.17 
Finland 0.18 
Canada 0.19 
Sweden 0.27 
Germany 0.32 
France 0.41 
United States 0.47 
United Kingdom 0.50 
Source: Corak (2006). 
The IGEs provided by Corak (2006) are the “preferred” IGEs. For each country, there is a 
range of estimation by different studies (consult the appendix of Corak (2006) for an excellent 
list of estimates by authors, sorted by countries). The ranges of estimates have upper bounds 
clear enough to see some distinction among countries. 
IGEs by countries 
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Jantti et al. (2006) analyze data from four Nordic countries, the U.S. and the U.K., and 
create mobility matrices of these countries. One of the highlights includes the probability of a 
son staying in the bottom quintile conditional on having a father in the lowest quintile: the 
probability is 0.422 for the U.S., 0.303 for the U.K. and generally below 0.3 for all Nordic 
countries. The authors also find higher mobility from the bottom quintiles to the top quintiles for 
the Nordic countries, as compared to the U.S. and the U.K. Mobility among the middle quintiles 
is not particularly different across all countries. Interestingly, for daughters, Jantti et al. (2006) 
find somewhat different results. IGEs across countries are typically lower for women than men 
(except for the U.K.). 
To shift focus from using men’s income, Raaum et al. (2007) study intergenerational 
mobility with an emphasis on gender and marital status for Denmark, Finland, Norway, the U.S. 
and the U.K. They confirm the previous result that Nordic countries have a higher mobility than 
the U.K. and the U.S. But when the authors used married women’s own income (as opposed to 
income earned with their partners or family members) to find IGEs, the results are similar across 
countries. They also find that in the U.S. and the U.K., married women with children who have 
high-income husbands tend to work fewer hours. The potential reasons are “assortative mating” 
and “labor supply response”: women from a wealthy background tend to marry high-income 
men, and they also tend work less after marriage which leads to lower wage income. 
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2.2.3 Intergenerational Mobility and Inequality 
In general, what we have observed so far is a pattern that Nordic countries and Canada 
seem to have higher mobility, while the U.S., the U.K., and France seem to have lower mobility, 
at least for income and wealth dimensions. The statistics vary across countries, but the pattern 
nevertheless holds. Some authors, such as Jantti et al. (2006), attribute this particular pattern to 
the welfare state of Canada and the Nordic countries. They suggest that the welfare state leads to 
lower inequality and with lower inequality comes higher mobility. This hypothesis goes along 
with what we present above in section 2.1 about inequality. Recall from that section that 
inequality falls when we move from the U.S. to France and to Sweden. Similarly, IGEs of these 
countries follow the same pattern. When IGEs are plotted against the Gini coefficients (a classic 
index of inequality) of various countries, we observe what is called “the Great Gatsby Curve,” 
introduced in a speech by Alan Krueger, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (See 
Figure 10).  The Great Gatsby curve shows a negative correlation between inequality and 
mobility. 
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Figure 10 
 
While acknowledging the explanation that the welfare state of  Canada and the Nordic 
countries helps with mobility, Corak (2013) cautions against such a definite conclusion. He 
points out that systematic differences among countries could have contributed to the differences 
in IGEs. In particular, he notes that the Nordic countries have a relatively homogeneous 
population, which makes it hard to compare them with the U.S., a multicultural country. A more 
reasonable comparison would be one between the U.S. and Canada, which also has diverse racial 
and ethnic groups. 
In addition, what the Great Gatsby curve provides is mostly a snapshot in time: we 
observe inequality and intergenerational mobility (approximately) at a point in time. What would 
be interesting is to view how both trends of inequality and mobility interact over time. Though, 
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as we saw in section 2.1, we know the trends of income and wealth inequality across time for 
different countries, we have yet to observe trends of intergenerational mobility in individual 
countries. 
There is also an intrinsic difficulty in combining intergenerational mobility with 
inequality: the former can only be observed over a period of time (between two generations), 
while the latter can be observed at an instance in time (at least theoretically). If we let t denote 
time, then intergenerational mobility is a function of a range of t, while inequality is a function of 
only one value of t. What the Great Gatsby Curve shows us is an interaction of two functions: 
one is one variable and the other is multivariable. It would be interesting to view the interaction 
of mobility and inequality as that of two multivariable functions. In other words, perhaps we 
should view the impact of the evolution of inequality over some period of time on 
intergenerational mobility. The key to this direction of research is to choose appropriate ranges 
of time for both factors. It is unclear if the current literature has tackled the problem in this 
manner.  
As we can see later on after the third essay, this view on the interaction between 
inequality and mobility has a stronger theoretical motivation when early childhood development 
is taken into account. 
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2.3 Comment on Inequality, Intergenerational Mobility and Social 
Mobility  
2.3.1 Social Mobility – A View by Gregory Clark 
As we can see from the above section, intergenerational mobility is hard to study, partly 
due to the limitations and inconsistency of the data and partly due to the difficulty of defining 
precisely what we mean by lifetime earnings (or other lifetime levels of the dimension under 
study). One might think that without understanding mobility between two generations, it would 
be impossible to study multigeneration mobility. Surprisingly, however, researchers have 
attempted to study multigenerational mobility.  
A prominent figure in this branch of research is Gregory Clark, an economic historian at 
University of California, Davis. In his book The Son Also Rises, Clark uses surname data to track 
the resilience of social status. By categorizing surnames into low or high social status, he wants 
to know how long it takes for a certain surname to lose its status. For example, Clark asks 
questions such as 
If surname such as Pepys or Brudenell-Bruce had a high status in 1800, how 
rapidly does that surname regress to average status? If Baskerville was an elite 
name in the Domesday Book of 1086 in England, is there any echo of that 
distinction in 1300, 1500 or now? 
Since surnames and their associated data (wealth, occupation, etc.) are available in 
records dating back centuries, there is a base to study mobility over a very long time. The finding 
of this branch of research is striking: it often takes a very long time for social status to regress to 
the mean, often as long as ten to twelve generations. This means that social mobility is extremely 
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low, much lower than the rate at which we see in the literature of intergenerational mobility. 
Clark notes that this result agrees with the common sense that it is hard for people to move out of 
the social class that they are born in.  
Furthermore, Clark finds that the phenomenon is similar across countries and continents: 
there is not much difference between the English-speaking countries and their Nordic 
counterparts. The result is also applicable to Asian countries like China, Korea, and Japan.  
With this finding, Clark provides a theory of social mobility. There are two assumptions 
in Clark’s theory. The first is that there is a distinction between an apparent social status and a 
deeper social competence. The observable social status could be income, wealth, health, 
education, etc. The social competence is an unobservable factor which influences other apparent 
factors. If 𝑦𝑡 is a measure of some observable social status factor (income, for example), and 𝑥𝑡 
is the social competence for a generation 𝑡, then the assumption becomes: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 , 
where 𝑢𝑡 is a random component. This 𝑢𝑡 random component reflects luck as well as choices of 
the person to invest in some status factor rather than others. For example, 𝑢𝑡 might reflect a 
person’s preference for income (choice to be a banker) rather than for very high level of 
education (choice to be a professor).  
The second assumption is that there is a high level of transmission of social competence 
across generations and thus social status regresses very slowly to the mean. In other words, 
mobility is inherently slow. The second assumption can be expressed formally as: 
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𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑏𝑥𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡, 
where 𝑒𝑡 is another random factor, and 𝑏 is a persistence rate (which shows how much social 
competence retains across two generations). Clark claims that the persistence rate 𝑏 is very large 
across countries and culture. The expected value of IGE 𝛽 in section 2.2 above, accordingly to 
Clark, is not 𝑏; rather it is some 𝜃𝑏, where 𝜃 is a number less than one. That is why we observe 
very low levels of 𝛽 in intergenerational mobility research. Throughout his book, Clark presents 
empirical analyses on surname data to test this simple theory. Due to the scope of this project, we 
do not delve too deep into the detailed technicality of the studies Clark cites. Generally the 
analyses show that the persistence rate 𝑏 is about 0.70 – 0.80 across countries. 
If Clark’s theory on social mobility is correct, perhaps what is most striking in the view 
of mobility is his conclusion. In the introduction of his book, he states that 
The practical implication is that if you want to maximize your children’s chances, 
you need to pay attention not to the social phenotype of your marriage partner but 
instead to his or her status genotype. That genotype is indicated by the social 
group your potential partner belongs to, as well as the social phenotype of their 
siblings, parents, grandparents, cousins, and so on to the nth degree of relatedness. 
Once you have selected your mate, your work is largely done. You can safely 
neglect your offspring, confident that the innate talents you secured for them will 
shine through regardless. 
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Clark’s conclusion, for the most part, is genetically deterministic: how one’s life turns out 
is mostly determined by one’s genes. This conclusion undoubtedly would cause great 
controversy, since it means that, for the most part, the social order is predetermined. The only 
way for one to move up in society is to marry the “right” person with a “superior” genotype. The 
American Dream which promises mobility with hard work is, indeed, just a dream. Fortunately, 
Clark’s theory is not flawless. But since Clark’s approach shares the same drawbacks with that of 
the studies of inequality and intergenerational mobility surveyed above, we incorporate all three 
branches of research into one discussion below. 
2.3.2 The Mechanism of Mobility – The Missing Piece of the Puzzle 
Up to now, we have surveyed very broad issues related to inequality and mobility. In 
section 2.1, we presented general trends of income and wealth inequality since the early 20th 
century, using income and estate tax data. Currently, the pattern across countries is that income 
and wealth inequality has increased once again to the level of the early 20th century, especially in 
the U.S. and the U.K. In section 2.2, we looked at intergenerational mobility, the analysis of how 
children’s generations differ from parents’ generations.  The IGEs across countries show us once 
again that the U.S. and the U.K. seem to have higher IGEs than the Nordic countries, which 
means mobility seems lower for the former countries. At the beginning of this section, we 
presented a branch of study on surnames and social status that tracks social mobility over 
multiple generations. The result of the study is a controversial theory stating that “social 
competence” is highly correlated across generations, and that social mobility is inherently slow 
for all countries, and there is nothing to be done about that. 
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The content of the first section is of high interest mainly because income and wealth are 
arguably one of the most important quantifiable concepts used in economics. Viewing the 
distribution of income and wealth allows us to see an important part of social welfare. Though 
there is no consensus on what the distribution should look like, society (aside from the very few 
economic winners) generally agrees that extreme inequality reflects low social welfare of the 
general population. This extremely unequal state of welfare prompts an inquiry into the heart of 
the American Dream: social mobility. Is the state of inequality a trade-off that society has 
endured in exchange for a higher mobility for future generations? In other words, does everyone 
accept a smaller portion of the economic pie today in exchange for a much larger piece tomorrow 
for their children? Are some people in the society sacrificing a smaller share of the pie today 
because they know that their children will have a bigger share tomorrow? The intergenerational 
mobility study is another step to answer these questions. If inequality turns out to reflect low 
social welfare, intergenerational mobility reveals how this bleak result transmits across 
generations. Intergenerational mobility can then be viewed as an extension of the study of 
inequality to more than one generation. 
The study of intergenerational mobility has its own limitations, however. At least until 
now, this branch of research can only study as far back as two generations since data for multiple 
generations is not available. The use of last names as a means to track social mobility can be 
considered as an attempt to go around the data limitation to study mobility across generations. 
However, there is a distinction between the two branches. Intergenerational mobility research 
often analyzes particular dimensions such as income, education or health, while social mobility 
research uses “social status” as the main factor for analysis. Both branches try to capture the 
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notion of mobility, but the “social status” concept used by the latter is not as quantifiable as the 
dimensions used in the former. Though social status might come with high earnings and wealth, 
the two concepts are by no means identical. 
In any case, there is a similarity among the study of income inequality, intergenerational 
mobility and social mobility: they focus on people’s “final outcomes.” In income and wealth 
inequality, the variables of analysis are adults’ incomes and wealth. In intergenerational 
mobility, dimensions of analysis such as income, education, or wealth are measured as “lifetime” 
factors. There is an implicit assumption that there exists some number for each dimension to 
represent the “lifetime” value of it; these could be prime age income, highest level of education, 
or lifetime expectancy, etc. For social mobility theory, “social status” can only be considered 
when a person has reached his or her heyday. Indeed, it takes years of education as well as 
practice for a person to become a doctor, a lawyer, or a professor. In income and wealth 
inequality study, income and wealth can be measured at different ages; in intergenerational 
mobility, lifetime earning is measured by averaging income across multiple prime years; and in 
social mobility, only the highest social status over a life time is considered. As we move from the 
first branch of research to the third one, at least when we consider their ages, the levels of 
maturity of the subjects under analysis increase. 
While it is useful for these three branches of research to focus on people when they are 
adult or are at the peak of their life, the method of inquiry does not pay enough attention to why 
and how people arrive at these results. By looking at the problem in a “big picture” view, we 
miss out on the details that create the differences in development. Because of this big picture 
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view, the policy suggestions to curb inequality or to boost mobility only solve the problem at an 
outcome level. We only deal with an aftermath of something inherently wrong that leads to 
inequality. If the lack of mobility is a disease, then the policy suggestions from a big picture 
view are just a treatment for the symptoms: what we need is a medicine for the cause of the 
illness. 
 When Clark attributes the slow rate of regression to the mean of social status to “social 
competence,” he is attempting to answer the question “What drives social mobility?” 
Unfortunately, Clark succumbs to the easy answer of “genes.” To arrive at such an answer when 
observing different results of adults is to overlook the eighteen (and perhaps longer) years that 
help form the characteristics of the subjects. If a mere four years of college education for a 
young adult can lead to a significant income increase (presumably from learned skills during that 
four years), how profoundly might the period of roughly two decades after birth affect that 
person’s achievement? Using “genotype” as an answer to the difference of outcomes is to ignore 
the very important process of growing up. 
More research should be conducted on the mechanism that leads to the differentiation of 
adults’ outcomes or social status. It is not until the complexity of development is understood that 
we can figure out the driver of inequality and lack of mobility, and can have appropriate policy 
suggestions. In the next essay, we introduce what has been done in this research direction and 
suggest an alternative explanation to the bleak deterministic results presented in the current 
essay. 
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ESSAY 3  
The Mechanisms of Inequality 
Transmission 
 As we can see from the prior essay, research on income and wealth inequality for the 
most part focuses on the “outcome” of inequality, not the process that lead to such inequality. In 
this essay, we attempt to understand the process that leads to inequality. In section one, we 
survey the recent methodologies utilized to study the potential causal mechanisms of differences 
in intergenerational mobility. In section two, we present some interdisciplinary research showing 
the importance of the early childhood periods in deciding the outcomes in adulthood. In the third 
section, we then integrate the information in the first two sections to the context of equality of 
opportunity. 
3.1 Summary of methodologies to mechanisms that can influence 
inequality of mobility. 
         There have been several attempts in social science to separate the forces of nature and 
nurture that influence development. Since both factors are intertwined in collected data, various 
econometric methods are employed to disentangle them. In this section, we adopt the 
encompassing literature review by Black and Devereux (2010) to categorize the methodologies. 
The first sub-section focuses on income dimension, and the second sub-section explores other 
dimensions. 
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 3.1.1 Methodologies and results in education and income dimensions. 
Recall from our prior chapter that intergenerational elasticity (IGE) is the coefficient of 
the parental independent factor (i.e. income or education) on the regression6 with the children 
factor as dependent variable. IGE is used extensively throughout the methods surveyed below. 
There are six major approaches employed in studying the causal mechanism of parental income 
and education on children’s outcomes.  
Method 1: Sibling and Neighborhood Correlations 
a. Sibling correlation:   
This method uses correlation of log earnings among siblings to determine the degree of 
transition of parental characteristics to children earnings. The logic is that siblings’ correlation is 
supposed to be positive and higher than correlation with strangers due to inheritance of similar 
traits from biological connection. Results show that sibling correlations are high for the US, 
about 0.4 and 0.5 for brothers, depending on datasets and methods by different researchers 
(Mazumder (2008) and Bjorkklund (2002)). The results are much lower for Nordic countries, 0.2 
for brothers, and 0.15 for sisters (Raaum, Salvanes and Sorensen (2006)).  
b. Neighborhood Correlation:  
Using cluster-based sampling procedure, Page and Solon (2003a) try to estimate how 
much of brother earning correlation is from neighborhood effects. Their general main result is 
that correlation for unrelated boys (only data for males is available in this study) in the same 
neighborhood is about 0.16, one half that of brother correlations. Similar studies, such as those of 
                                                          
6 log(𝑦1) = 𝛼 + 𝛽 log(𝑦0) + 𝜖 
 57 
 
Raaum, Salvanes, and Sorensen (2006), and Oreopoulos (2003), show that the effect is much 
lower for Norway (0.05) and Canada (close to zero). Results for education correlation are much 
lower still. In general, the evidence suggests that neighborhood does not seem to be a major 
factor explaining similarity among siblings. Note that no conclusion about causal effects can be 
made. 
Method 2: Structural analysis of different types of siblings. 
 As an attempt to study difference of nature and nurture determinants of income, 
Bjorklund et al (2005), following works done in 1970s (such as that of Behrman et al. (1977)), 
utilize differences among Swedish identical twins, fraternal twins, full siblings, half siblings, and 
adopted siblings to estimate the effects of genetic, shared environmental, and idiosyncratic 
factors. Their simple model is: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑔𝐺𝑖 + 𝑠𝑆𝑖 + 𝑢𝑈𝑖, 
 where G, S, and U represent the above factors, respectively. Using different sets of 
assumptions, from strong to relaxed ones, they are able to estimate covariance of different forms 
of siblings. When assumptions are stringent, the result shows that genetic factor (with coefficient 
g) has stronger effect than shared environment (coefficient s). However, when assumptions are 
relaxed, g and s are closer; yet the estimation is imprecise. Overall, the largest impact comes 
from non-shared environment for all models (coefficient u). However, the result might not be 
generalized since data is only available for 3 years, and the variance decomposition is limited to 
the sample. 
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Method 3: Decomposition of intergenerational persistence 
 This approach interprets IGE as a compound of direct effects from parental income as 
well as indirect effects from other immediate factors. Examples of indirect factors include 
cognitive ability and education of sons (as affected by parents’ income). Empirical results from 
Bowles and Gintis (2002) imply that cognitive ability and educational attainment can explain up 
to ⅗ of IGE. With further assumptions, they show that genetic can explain only a small portion 
of IGE (this by no mean implies that gene is unimportant). Blanden, Gregg, and Macmillan 
(2007) add non-cognitive skills as an immediate factor; they find that a large portion of IGE can 
be explained by cognitive and non-cognitive skills that affect educational attainment. This 
method is hard to interpret since these immediate factors can be influenced in the first place by 
both genetic and other environmental factors themselves. Again, the evidence found here is only 
suggestive, not causal. 
Method 4: Sibling and twin differences 
 This method uses similarity in genes of identical twin mothers to identify the effects of 
mother’s education on children’s education (fixed effects method). The method can also control 
for effects of father’s characteristics. 
 Empirical results by Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) using the Minnesota Twin 
Registry show that the mother’s education might have a negative impact on children schooling 
(might be because of neglect of mother on children due to mother’s labor force participation); 
Antonovics and Goldberger (2005) suggest that the result might be because of the coding of the 
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data. Different sets of results are found based on different studies from Bingley, Christensen, 
Myrup, and Jensen (2009), Pronzato (2009), and Holmlund, Lundahl, and Plug (2008): positive 
effect or not significant effect of mother education, or differences of parents born before or after 
1945, etc.  
Overall, despite the innovative approach of using twin data, it is not without weakness: 
parents might treat children differently; even identical twins have different personalities, or there 
might be interaction among children of identical twin mothers (aunt’s influence on nephews or 
nieces), etc. The main problem of the approach is its reliance on these strong assumptions. 
Method 5: Regression analysis using adoptees. 
 There are two main assumptions for this method: (1) adoptees are randomly assigned to 
families and (2) adoptees are treated exactly the same as non-adoptees. There are three main 
approaches for this method: bivariate regression approach, multivariate regression approach, and 
an approach integrating information of both biological and adoptive parents. 
 The bivariate regression approach compares factor 𝜆 of between adopted children and 
non-adopted children using the regression: 
𝑦1 = 𝛼 + 𝜆 ∗ 𝑦0 + 𝜖, 
Where 𝑦1 is an outcome variable (i.e. log earning) of the child, and 𝑦0 is the corresponding 
variable of the adoptive parents. The expected effects are: 
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(1) if nurture is unimportant and nature is important, then 𝜆 is zero for adoptees and positive 
for non-adoptees 
(2) If nurture is important and nature is not, then 𝜆 is positive and equal for both 
 This means that the relative difference of both is also important. 
 The usual problem is that assignment of adoption is definitely not random; parents have 
to pass certain conditions chosen by agencies. Sacerdote (2007) uses data of Korean-Americans 
adoptees assigned by first come, first serve basis. The result shows very large difference between 
𝜆 of adoptees and non-adoptees, 0.09 versus 0.32; this implies that genetic is very important. 
Plug (2004) uses data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey (WLS) and finds a large 
coefficient of 0.28 for adoptive mother education, but the adoption assignment is not random. 
Bjorklund et al. (2006) find a strong effect of adoptive parents’ log income on children’s log 
income in Sweden; Liu and Zeng (2009) find insignificant evidence of log income when using 
PSID data for the U.S.  
 The second regression approach uses multivariate regression. This approach tries to 
identify particular parental factors that affect children the most by adding many factors into the 
regression. This approach has its limits since we cannot control every possible factor, and some 
factors are highly correlated with others. Nevertheless, some important potential causal factors 
are: mother education, family size, and family income. Careful incorporation of data from 
adoptee can show causal effects: adoptees assigned to families with high socio-economic status 
(high parental education, small family size, high income) have a greater chance of development 
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(A list of studies using this approach is available at panel B, table  3 in Black and Devereux 
(2010)). 
 The last approach integrates information of both biological and adoptive parents into the 
regression of children’s outcomes. The data mainly comes from the Swedish registry (data of 
both biological and adoptive parents is often limited). The main result from Bjorklund et al 
(2007) is that both genetic and nurture factors are important. Moreover, there is evidence of the 
interaction between genetic and environment in determining children’s outcomes. 
Method 6: Natural Experiments/ Instrumental Variable (IV) Approach 
 The natural experiment approach utilizes the unusual variations in parents’ income or 
education to identify any effects on children’s outcomes. 
 Income:  
There are two approaches with regard to income: the first one analyzes influences of 
welfare programs, and the second one analyzes the effects of income or job-related shocks. 
Welfare programs included in the first approach range from Earned Income Tax Credit (ETIC) to 
Food Stamp. A more comprehensive summary of programs and results of the first approach can 
be found in Almond and Curie (2010).  
For the second approach, shocks on parental income mainly relate to parents’ job loss; 
effects on children are measured on outcomes such as income or education attainment. Typical 
works on this approach include Shea (2000); Oreopoulous, Page and Stevens (2008); Rege, 
Telle, and Votruba (2007). Though the results are not entirely conclusive on causal effects (for 
 62 
 
example, the events can lead to changes in other intermediate factors that eventually affect 
outcomes) the second approach generally implies that parents’ income shocks do have effects on 
children’s outcomes.  
Education:  
Various educational policies changes have been used as instruments to explore causal 
relationship from parental generation to that of children. For example, policies include: 
lengthening of compulsory education in Norway (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2005)), 
change in education policy due to students’ riot (Maurin and McNally (2008)), or maternal 
education’s diversity due to variation in educational cost (Carneiro, Meghir, and Parey (2007)), 
etc. The dependent factors in children’s generation include total years of education, retention 
rate, or grade repetition, etc. A summary of instrumental variable approach on education is 
available on panel C of table 3 in Black and Devereux (2010). There are some results suggesting 
positive impacts of additional parental education on children’s outcomes.  
Black and Devereux (2010) qualify that despite the innovative strategies utilized in the 
IV approach, it is always vulnerable to two main problems: instrument credibility and 
generalizability. An instrument might be argued to cause a change to another factor which in turn 
has a direct effect on outcomes, or the effect of the instrument is only locally applicable to a 
subset of the population. 
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The main problem with the studies on income and education dimensions: 
 Black and Devereux (2010) note that across the research body using twins, adoptees and 
IV on income and education dimensions, results vary tremendously. Holmlund, Lindahl, and 
Plug (2008) attempt to reconstruct the studies with different methods on only one dataset from 
Sweden; they find that part of the differences is methodology-specific, rather than country-
specific. Different methods affect different cohorts of the population (twins are independent of 
the distribution of the population, adoptees are more prevalent at higher income families, and IV 
is often relevant to lower cohort). They also find that OLS overestimates the intergenerational 
relationship. This means that there is a potential non-linearity effect. Black and Devereux note 
that there are research studies looking into this issue, but inconsistency is still widespread (as 
illustrated by their summary table 3) – additional research in this direction is warranted. 
3.1.2 Some results in other dimensions.  
Research on intergenerational mobility extends to dimensions beyond income and 
education, including: IQ/ability, jobs and occupations, welfare receipt, health, attitude and social 
behavior, consumption and wealth. These studies utilize available data of both parent and 
children generations on respective dimensions to determine the level of intergenerational 
elasticity. A summary table of articles cited in Black and Devereux (2010) is provided at the end 
of this project. 
3.1.3 Comment on the causal mechanism research 
As we can see from the literature review above, the body of research into causal 
mechanism of intergenerational mobility involves very innovative approaches to identify 
different impacts of genes and environmental factors on children’s development. There are many 
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different methodologies to explore the cross-generational relationship, but all target three main 
aspects: twins, adoptees and instrumental variables. In addition, dimensions of research extend 
beyond income and education to others such as ability, job and occupation, health, etc. The main 
goal of this trend of research is to explore if there is evidence of transmission of traits from 
parents to children and how the transmission works.  
So far, results are inconsistent across the literature. The general pattern, however, is that 
both gene and environment are important for children’s outcomes. We should also note that most 
of the results found in the studies are available thanks to the data from Nordic countries. As data 
similar to Nordic countries’ is available in other parts of the world, more research with the same 
direction can be conducted. This does not mean that there is no direction for application of the 
results. For example, Black and Devereux (2010) note that results from Nordic countries imply 
that education policy changes that head towards longer time of compulsory education in one 
generation might have positive impacts on earnings of future generations. It is these suggestive 
evidences that prompt the need for more innovative methodologies in the direction of causal 
mechanism of intergenerational transmission. 
We also should note that for the methods surveyed so far, the factors of both parent and 
children generations mainly focus on adulthood period. Since childhood and other lifetime 
periods are very different from one another, perhaps looking at each period separately would 
allow some insights into the intergenerational transmission of traits. In the next section, we draw 
attention to the early childhood period. 
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3.2 Summary of inequality of opportunity in early life 
          
Among many different developmental stages, the early childhood period is arguably the 
most important phase. Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, and Shonkoff (2006) provide an excellent 
literature review of neurological, behavioral and economic foundations for this hypothesis. It is 
maintained that in the early childhood period, neural circuits are plastic, highly malleable with 
stimulation, helping the subject adapt to the environment. A nourishing environment early in life 
allows the brain to efficiently acquire foundational skill sets. And since skill sets are sequential, 
mastery of these basic skill sets leads to further efficiency in learning more advanced skills. 
Evidence for the hypothesis at the neurological level includes case studies for animals as 
well as humans7. For humans, children younger than age 7 are significantly better at learning a 
new language compared to those who are older or who are adults. When prompted with the 
environments they experienced in early life, the subjects can re-adapt easily. Knudsen, Heckman, 
Cameron, and Shonkoff (2006) conclude that “early learning establishes a brain architecture in 
juveniles that enables increased functional plasticity in adulthood.”  
Evidence of the importance of early childhood development goes beyond the 
neurological level to the behavioral realm8. These studies show that early childhood experience 
                                                          
7 For example, experiments on owls show that manipulation of auditory experience in juvenile owls leads 
to structural change in their brains (to adapt to the manipulated environment); adult owls did not show 
changes when exposed to the same conditions. 
8 For example, an experiment on monkeys shows that infant monkeys separated from their mothers in the 
early months tend to have self-comforting rather than groups-supporting behaviors. These same 
monkeys tend to behave aggressively later in life. The infant monkeys which are adopted by female 
figures early enough after separation from their mothers do not show significant aberrations.  Experiments 
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can significantly impact later life behavioral characteristics, which in turn implies that adversities 
in early life might cause long-term deficiencies which are hard to alleviate. 
Knudsen et al. (2006) explain that research studies such as these support the neurological 
and behavioral general principles that neural circuits are highly amenable during the early life 
period, and the structure of the brain becomes more rigid and harder to change over time. These 
principles work across species, and thus play a crucial role in the study of inequality of 
opportunity. Children born in disadvantaged environments might not be able to develop strong 
neural, behavioral and emotional foundations to further acquire skills that are necessary for their 
later development. Born in an environment with not enough attention from adults (possibly from 
parents’ economic constraints, or lack of government’s child support), poor health care, low 
investment in early education, a child cannot expect to catch up with his or her peers who do not 
suffer from such adversities. The sequence of achievements which eventually leads to economic 
outcome in adulthood is highly determined in the very initial starting point.  
One might argue that intervention later in life might help. A study in the same review by 
Knudsen et al (2006) shows that intervention later in life for disadvantaged children does help, 
but only for a short time; the impact lasts for a longer time if intervention happens much early in 
life. The result is consistent with the basic brain plasticity principle. The disadvantage caused in 
early years might be too large, which leads to harder intervention later in life. For example, Hart 
and Riley (2003) conduct an experiment with 42 families of different income levels by tracking 
how many words children are exposed to from age 1 to age 3. They find that by age 3, the gap of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
on rats also show that those brought up by attentive rats became calm, adventurous and attentive parents, 
regardless of their biological parents’ behaviors. 
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words heard between a child born in a families of parents who are professionals and a child born 
in a families who are on welfare programs is 30 million words. This tremendous difference 
would lead children to different development tracks.   
Put in a larger inequality context, it might be projected that a major part of income 
inequality at the moment was already determined a long time ago when the now adults had very 
unequal early life development. The claims that unequal economic outcomes are mainly due to 
differences in genetics, and that there is a big-trade-off between equality and efficiency as 
mentioned in Mankiw (2013) do not give enough weight to the impacts of environment on 
shaping early development. It’s not until the upbringing environments for children are equal that 
we can attribute the differences in economic outcomes to genetics. 
As mentioned above, any phases of human development are affected by a multitude of 
factors. With such importance of the early childhood period, inequality of opportunity should be 
studied by analyzing this period from the diverse contributing factors. These include but are not 
limited to: health care, child support, parents income, education, neighborhood, etc.  
Researches focusing on these factors during childhood period have yielded some results. 
For example, Hoynes, Almond, and Schanzenbach (2012) discover that children having 
benefited from Food Stamp Programs during childhood show, decades later, “significant 
reduction in incidence of ‘metabolic syndromes’” and “for women, an increase in economic self-
sufficiency”. Another study by Chetty, Friedman, Hilger, Saez, Schanzenbach and Yagan (2011) 
analyze the long-term effects of attending small classes (compared with attending large classes) 
in kindergarten. The study is based on Project STAR - a random experiment assigning 11,571 
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students to different classes. The main result is that higher quality kindergarten experience has a 
significant impact on test scores as well as earnings in adulthood. The research suggests that the 
high quality classroom experience provides children with non-cognitive skills such as “effort, 
initiate, and lack of disruptive behavior”. In another paper, Lugwig and Miller (2007) use 
regression discontinuity design to study the impact of Head Start Program (a program helping 
poor children aged 3- 5 and their family) on children, and the main finding is that the program 
seems to help reduce the mortality rate of children as well as increase educational attainment.  
In particular, the Equality of Opportunity Project led by Raj Chetty and Nathaniel 
Hendren produces some interesting results on early development. In particular, Chetty and 
Hendren (2015) find causal effects of neighborhood on children’s earnings in adulthood. The 
team of researchers gather data of families who moved across areas in the U.S.; they look at 
impact of the new neighborhood on children’s future income, conditional on their ages when the 
families moved. Applying quasi-experimental approximation technique, Chetty and Hendren 
(2015) find that neighborhood can have positive or negative impact on children outcome. The 
earlier a child is exposed to a neighborhood (the earliest age the data allows is 9), the larger the 
impact has on him or her; furthermore, after a certain age (about 20), moving to a better or worse 
neighborhood does not affect the child’s outcome. The research is so able to calculate the 
percentage change in income resulted from being exposed an additional year to a good or bad 
county (among the 100 largest counties) in comparison with the national average for families 
having income at 25th percentile level. For example, they find that a year spent in DuPage, IL 
increases a child’s earning by 0.76%, which results in 15% increase for a person spending 20 
years growing up in the neighborhood, relative to the national average. The researchers find that 
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there are five factors associated with a “good” neighborhood: less racial segregation, better 
school, lower income inequality, lower violent crime rates, and lower portion of single-parent 
households. Even though data for children with age lower than 9 were not available, with the 
evidence of early development at the beginning of this section, it is likely that the effects of 
neighborhood on children’s outcomes in Chetty and Hendren (2015) are analogous for younger 
children. The important point here is that the younger the kids, they more impact environment 
has on them. Research studies such as these help shed light on the potential impacts of different 
factors on the crucial early childhood period. 
3.3  Implication on equality of opportunity  
From section one, we can see that both genetic and environmental factors are important 
for development, but from section two, it is suggestive that in the very early stage in life, genetic 
characteristics are highly amenable. Passing a certain age, however, it is harder, if not 
impossible, to change the structure of the brain. This carries a profound implication on equality 
of opportunity since it means that the majority of cognitive and social ability, the innate 
ingredient to utilize available opportunity, is formed in the very early stage of life. Note that the 
effect of early formed ability goes both ways: a strong ability will create positive impact, while 
low ability create negative one. Extreme cases such as a genius with socio-behavioral problems 
or a very social, likeable student with low academic ability are prominent examples. Deficient 
development in either cognitive or social ability can carry long-lasting impacts throughout life. 
What should be targeted for each individual is at least a decent level of ability to thrive when he 
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or she is faced with different circumstances later in life – an early favorable environment is the 
starting point, if the theory proves to be correct. 
Reinforcing the ability for the whole population has impacts both on equalizing 
opportunity and creating freedom for people to choose what they want to do. When the general 
level of ability of the population is high, and the variation of ability is low, the number of “types” 
of people in the society would be controlled to a limited number (recall from essay 1 that a 
“type” is a set of people with the same vector of circumstances). When the number of “types” is 
low, it is easier to implement Roemer’s redistribution policy algorithm since we are working 
with a system with fewer variables. In addition, with enhanced ability of the general population, 
it can be argued that people would enjoy more freedom as well. A person with low ability, for 
example, would have a lower number of career choices. Indeed, the standardized test system is 
designed to filter out people with high or low abilities in certain fields. Students who do not 
perform well in the LSAT, the required test for all law school applicants in the US, would 
definitely have no chance of becoming a lawyer, even if they desperately want to (assuming they 
have tried their best, but still failed to do well on the test). In a sense, by improving ability for all, 
we are eliminating the obstacle arising from ability differentiation barrier. 
What is the aim of investing in early childhood NOT about? It is not about equating 
children’s ability to the same level. Rather, it means that children should be nurtured in a higher 
standard; circumstances for growing up have to be favorable. Looking at it in a different way, we 
are trying to eliminate the lower level ability, the lower tail of the distribution of ability.  
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This goal is also not about disregarding the development of older children or adults. 
Rather, it’s about focusing resources on the group with the highest potential of growth. It is a 
redistribution of redistributive policy. This direction of policy making would create a future 
workforce with a very strong base. 
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Summary of redistribution proposal. 
Premise 1: Innate and environmental factors affect outcomes. 
Premise 2: Brain structure is highly plastic in early life. 
Premise 3: Brain structure affects ability. Once formed, ability is hard to change as people age. 
Conclusion: Investment from redistribution should focus on early childhood period. 
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Sections one and two also contribute to the evidence against those who use Nozick’s 
approach towards justice. Particularly, they undermine the viewpoint on the first principle of 
Nozick’s theory. Recall that in Nozick’s first principle of justice, it is stated that a person is 
entitled to a holding if he acquires the holding according to the principle of justice. Now, if we 
view “ability” as moldable, highly sensitive to surrounding environment, then the product of that 
molding process is a form of acquirable property: it can be formed by will and can be owned by 
some people. The interesting thing is, before this property is formed, it is influenced not by the 
subject himself, but by others around him. After the property is formed, however, it belongs the 
person alone: he can use it on his own will. Nevertheless, we should not make the mistake of 
viewing the ownership of this ability-property in all positive light. A person who grows up in a 
very hostile environment where both cognitive as well as social abilities are inhibited does not 
have any say towards that “low-quality” property. As long as the authority can influence the 
process of forming ability yet chooses not to, then the “low-quality” ability property is imposed 
upon the person. This is injustice. 
Nozick’s first principle of entitlement theory is not in itself a problem in our line of 
argument. Rather, what troublesome is the application of it to let the market forces tend to 
themselves the process of formation and distribution of holdings. In our current case, the 
particular holding is “ability”, a kind of holding that is too important to let the market decide on 
how to create and where to distribute. With this view, the application of Rawls’ theory of justice 
proves to be more reasonable. Recall that in Rawls’ theory, the first principle deal with basic 
liberty requirements, and the second principle deals with distribution of social and economic 
resources. An analogous application using our view of formation of ability requires an extension 
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of “basic liberty” to include more social and economic resources. The reasoning is 
straightforward: formation of ability requires some endowment of social and economic resources 
(on top of basic liberty). In order words, our claim encompasses both the first and the second 
principles of Rawls’ theory. 
The position we currently hold by no means implies that all nurturing factors are 
extensive, that we can completely change the effects of genetic factors. Of course people with 
different genes have different comparative advantages, but the key point here is that there is 
some basic level of capacity that we can build for children that would allow them to foster later 
when they get older. The standard for the basic capacity and the corresponding environment are 
to be decided in further research (and potentially political processes), but it should be noted that 
such standard is a necessity if we aim for a society with equal opportunity.    
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Discussion 
 
In essay one, we argued that if we are to apply Roemer’s model to the early childhood 
period, then redistribution should be arranged in such a way that each child lives at a minimum 
standard that fosters his or her cognitive and social ability. The main reason for this 
recommendation is that children have little to no influence on their effort – they are mostly 
affected by the surrounding environment. In the second essay, we pointed to the drawbacks in 
research on inequality and mobility, namely, that it does not pay attention to the process of 
human development, which includes the childhood period.  
The last essay provides a basis to reinforce the application of Roemer’s model in the first 
essay and solve the problem of the second essay. First, since early childhood development shows 
a long-term impact on adulthood achievements, applying Roemer’s model on this period could 
allow children to start their life with a higher set of skills, and could potentially decrease 
differences in skills across children with different circumstances (lower skill differentiation). 
Second, though there is a long time between early childhood and adulthood, it can be seen from 
the third essay that the early childhood period has a lasting impact on later development. By 
investing in early childhood, resulting in lower skill differentiation in children, the prospect of 
more equitable development in later periods of life is higher. The suggestion of investing in early 
childhood is thus a direction towards solving the process of development problem. 
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The long-lasting impact of early childhood development also helps explain why Clark’s 
theory on social mobility is deficient. Recall that Clark finds that social mobility is very slow 
when one uses data on surnames to track social status. He conjectures that there is a latent “social 
competence” factor that is highly correlated across generations. It is this “social competence” 
factor that decides the “stickiness” of social status. Clark claims that genes play a significant role 
in this social competence factor. But from the viewpoint of childhood development, it can be 
argued that it is not necessarily the genetic factor that influences the transmission of status across 
generations; rather it could be the case that investment or lack thereof in early childhood 
development plays a significant role in determining an individual’s “fate.” When a child is born 
into a family with a favorable social environment, he or she develops the kinds of abilities and 
skills that later allow him or her to succeed in life, assuming that the skills are still relevant when 
the child reaches adulthood. Families with high social status often provide a better environment 
for children than those with lower status. When the importance of the early childhood period is 
not well understood by the general public, development is dictated by family traditions. Those 
families with constructive traditions have a higher chance of staying or moving to a higher social 
status, and those without such traditions have lower chance for social mobility. The phenomenon 
of low social mobility across generations might reflect the unawareness of prior generations 
regarding how important early development is. 
As we can see from the above argument, the cornerstone of the current project is the 
hypothesis that early childhood development has a long-lasting impact on adulthood. Our project 
is limited in this regard since early childhood development is an interdisciplinary topic, and we 
cannot provide a definite answer for the hypothesis until further breakthroughs from related 
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fields (such as psychology, neuroscience, sociology, etc.) are at hand. To this extent, as more 
research studies in childhood development are conducted, the strengths and weaknesses of our 
project will become clearer. 
Though there have been programs that invest in children such as free public lower-level 
education, tax transfer for low income families, food stamps, and assisted health care, the scope 
and intensity of the programs should be widened considering the importance of the early 
childhood period. This is especially important for families with low income and parents with 
lower education since the parents themselves are more likely to be unaware or unable (due to 
lack of time and/or financial resources) to provide an environment that fosters healthy 
development. We by no means imply that investment in early childhood is the only way to curb 
inequality. It has been shown that there are fading out effects for some programs9. There should 
also be follow-up programs that aim to sustain the benefits of early childhood investment. The 
main message here is that if inequality is the result of a process of development, then the solution 
to the problem has to start at the earliest stage in life. 
We should note here that our suggestion of focusing on early childhood development 
with governmental policies does not undermine the importance of families’ private efforts to 
invest in their children. When we view the main goal of social mobility (adopting Clark’s 
approach) as attaining high social status, individual families’ investment in their children might 
reflect their decisions to take risks in the childhood period in the expectation that when the 
children grow up, they will attain higher social status. Whether the skills prepared during 
                                                          
9 Fading out effect is the phenomenon where the impact of a program does not show in the sample after a long 
period of time, even though there is some effect in the short term. 
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childhood will be valuable in the children’s adulthood is uncertain, since it also depends on the 
condition of the future society. There are professions, such as doctors or professors, that have 
had high social status over a long time, but most professions have undergone changes in social 
status. Movie stars or entrepreneurs did not have high social status until the society demanded 
the skills that they offer, be it mass entertainment or creative innovation. For social status to 
materialize, two ingredients must be present: adequate investment in skills and a favorable social 
environment. When families decide to invest in their children’s development, whether intentional 
or not, they are supplying skills for the future society, which in turn decides which sets of skills 
are highly valuable and which are not. The process sounds almost like natural selection in 
biology, yet the entity involved in this selection process is society itself. To this extent, 
respecting the unique investment of individual families in their children is the key to preserving 
diversity for the development of the society as a unit. 
We also should caution that the suggestion of targeting early childhood development as a 
means to address the cause of inequality does not imply that the “big picture” view of inequality 
is unimportant. For example, when Piketty claims that the driver of inequality of income and 
wealth is the fact that r > g, his argument is valid on a “macro” level. Our claim that the process 
that leads to inequality starts with early childhood development does not invalidate that macro 
claim10. To curb inequality, policies should be designed to solve problems at both the “macro” 
and the “process” levels. 
                                                          
10 r is the return on capital, and g is economic growth rate. Consult Piketty (2014) for details. 
 79 
 
In addition, our suggestion to pay more attention to the childhood development period 
does not entirely solve the theoretical problem of equality of opportunity as prompted by 
Roemer. What we suggest is only a partial solution to one period in life. There is still work to be 
done regarding equality of opportunity. What our suggestion does is to shorten the ability gap 
among children with the hope of decreasing the number of “types” (the sets of people with the 
same circumstance vectors). Thus, while Roemer’s model might cover the problem of inequality 
caused by meritocracy (people with different abilities belong to different “types,” and thus those 
with higher abilities can enjoy higher outcomes though they might not expend as much effort), 
this project does not address  that issue. Rather, it serves to promote a fairer form of meritocracy 
– one in which adults’ abilities are not predetermined by their childhood circumstances.  
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APPENDIX 
A summary of studies of intergenerational mobility using dimensions other than education and 
income (as cited in Black and Devereux (2010)) 
Dimension Author(s), year Description Finding 
IQ/Ability 
Black, 
Devereux, 
Salvanes 
(2009) 
Utilize Norwegian 
military data that 
include both 
fathers' and sons' 
IQ information 
Substantial increase in son IQ if father 
IQ is higher 
  
Bjorklund, 
Eriksson, and 
Jantti (2010) 
Same method as 
the prior study, 
but with data from 
Sweden. 
Find similar results as the prior study, 
but data from brothers suggest large 
influence of environment on IQ. 
  
Anger and 
Heineck (2009) 
Use the German 
Socio-Economic 
Panel Study with 
cognitive data for 
men and women. 
Esimates are larger than Scandinavian 
countries'. When using gender specific-
data, they find larger effect of mothers' 
IQ than fathers'. They also find gender-
specific effect: moms affect daugheter 
more and similarly for dads to sons. 
  
Gronqvist, 
Ockert and 
Vlachos (2009) 
Use Sweden draft 
data  (male-only) 
for cognitive and 
non-congitive 
skills 
Parents' coginitve ability matters more 
for education, while non-cognitive one 
matters more for earnings. 
Jobs and 
Occupations 
Hellerstein and 
Morrill (2008) 
Compare parents' 
and childrens' 
occupation in 
cohort around 
2008 
30% sons and 20% daughters have the 
same kind of occupations, but this 
depends on the definition of 
occupations. 
  
Ermish and 
Francesconi 
(2002) 
Use occupational 
prestige rank to 
correlat fathers' 
and sons' ranks 
(British 
Household 
Survey) 
0.4 to 0.75 for father - child pairs and 
0.30 to 0.50 for mother-child pairs, 
with higher resutl for higher status. 
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Carmichael 
(2000) and Di 
pietro and 
Urwin (2003) 
The former uses 
British data, the 
latter use Italian 
data, employing 
similar method as 
Ermish and 
Francesconi 
(2002) Strong father-son relationship. 
  
Corak and 
Piraino (2010) 
Look at fathers 
and sons who 
work for the same 
firms in Cananda. 
40% of men have work in the same 
company as their fathers'; the effect is 
higher for highe earners. 
  
Kramarz and 
Skans (2007)  
Analyze firm-
specific data 
Boys are more likely to get stable jobs 
at their fathers' plants, more applicable 
for lower income families. There's a 
symmetric relationship between 
mothers and daughters. 
Welfare 
Receipts 
Levine and 
Zimmerman 
(1996) 
Distinguish 
welfare trap from 
poverty trap. 
Most persistence in welfare comes 
from poverty trap. There are two 
issues: welfare trap and poverty trap. 
The former deals with the familiarity of 
children with welfare programs and so 
they adapt to these programs; the latter 
deals with poor children coming from 
poor background and enroll in welfare 
program. 
  
Beulieu et al. 
(2005) and 
Mitnik (2008) 
Both studies look 
at the intensity of 
dependence on 
welfare. The 
former looks at 
Canadian data, the 
latter examines 
data from 
California. 
The former finds more dependence on 
welfare from parents lead to more 
dependence on welfare by children. 
The latter finds no evidence from 
length of welfare exposure on future 
dependence. 
Health 
Akbulut an 
Kugler (2007) 
Analyze data on 
correlations of 
height, weight, 
BMI, depression 
and asthma in the 
US 
High correlation between children's 
and mothers' factors. 
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Loureiro et al 
(2006) 
Analyze smoking 
habits of parents 
and children 
Children are twice likely to smoke if 
both parents smoke, as compared to if 
both parents do not smoke. 
  
Currie and 
Moretti (2007)  
Use sibling 
mothers' data to 
eliminate family 
fixed effects. 
Children are more than 50% likely to 
have lower birrth weight if their 
mothers are in turn lower wieght at 
birth. Elasticity is about 0.2. 
Attitudes and 
social 
behavior 
Altonji and 
Dunn (2000) 
Study persistence 
in wage and work 
preference (NLS 
dataset) 
They propose that preferecences lead to 
work hour persistence across 
generation 
  
Mayer et al. 
(2005) 
Study mothers' 
and daughters' 
traits. (PSID 
dataset) 
Very small portion of traits' 
tranmission is due to socio-economic 
status. 
  
Wilhelm et al. 
(2008) 
Examine 
charitable 
behavior 
including 
religious and 
secular givings. 
Religious elasticity is larger than 
secular elasticity. 
  
Dohmen et al. 
(2008) 
Use the German 
Socio-Economic 
Panel Study to 
study attitude 
towards risk and 
trust. 
There is a positive corrolation across 
generations in attitude on risks and 
trust. 
  
Almond, 
edlund, and 
Milligan 
(2009) 
Study cultural 
persistence across 
generation by 
examining Asian 
immigrants to 
Canada. 
Find evidence that there's preference 
for having sons. 
  
Fernandez, 
Fogli, and 
Olivetti (2004) 
Study men's 
attitudes towards 
marriage by 
mothers' 
behaviors 
Men who grow up with working 
mothers tend to have wifes who work. 
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Consumption 
and wealth 
Waldkirch, Ng 
and Cox (2004) 
Use PSID dataset 
to explore 
consumption 
pattern across 
generation 
IGE of food consumption away from 
home is about .14 to .20; the effects 
come both from parental taste as well 
as income. 
  
Charles and 
Hurst (2003)  
Use wealth data 
from PSID to 
estimate IGE of 
wealth. 
The result is about .37, higher than 
other previous studies' suggestion. The 
portion of intergenerational cross-
quintile movement (parents from the 
top or bottom having children in 
bottom or top quintiles) is low, about 
20% to 25%.  
 
